Microfinance and Missing Markets by Emran, M. Shahe et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Microfinance and Missing Markets
M. Shahe Emran and A.K.M Mahbub Morshed and Joseph
E. Stiglitz
Columbia University, Southern Illinois University Carbondale,
Columbia University
April 2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/41451/
MPRA Paper No. 41451, posted 22. September 2012 06:50 UTC
Micronance and Missing Markets
M. Shahe Emran1
Department of Economics and ESIA, GWU
IPD, Columbia University
A.K.M. Mahbub Morshed
Department of Economics
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
Joseph E. Stiglitz
Columbia University
ABSTRACT
The existing theoretical analysis of micronance focuses on the nature of the loan con-
tract such as group liability. We draw attention to the role of missing or imperfect labor
market in understanding some of the important second generationdebates in micronance.
Our analysis helps explain a number puzzles in micronance such as (i) high repayment
rates with high interest rates, (ii) di¢ culties in scaling up projects, (iii) conicting views
about interest rate elasticity of demand for microcredit. The analysis implies that while
microcredit can play a vital role when labor markets are underdeveloped, demand for such
loans may progressively decline as markets develop.
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(1) Introduction
Micronance programs in developing countries have been enormously successful in pro-
viding credit to the poor women without any collateral who are largely bypassed by the
conventional banks. Their success attracted the attention of both academic economists
and policy practitioners around the world, and the agship micronance program Grameen
Bank in Bangladesh and its founder Muhammad Yunus have been awarded Nobel peace
prize in 2006. There is now a voluminous literature analyzing di¤erent aspects of the mi-
cronance revolution that swept across the developing world in last thirty years (for an
excellent recent survey, see Aghion and Morduch (2010)). The existing economic research
on micronance can be divided into two broad areas: (i) the theoretical analysis of the dis-
tinctive features of credit contracts (such as joint liability and dynamic incentives) with an
emphasis on their implications for solving the adverse selection and moral hazard problems
(see, for example, Stiglitz (1990), Besley and Coate (1995), Ghatak (2000), Aghion and
Morduch (2000), La¤ont and Rey (2003), La¤ont and Guessen (2000)), and (ii) the empir-
ical analysis that focuses on the evaluation of the e¤ects of such programs on the welfare of
the borrowers, especially the women (see, for example, Pitt and Khandker (1998), Banerjee
et al (2009), Morduch and Roodman (2009), Kaboski and Townsend (2005, forthcoming),
Emran et al. (2009)).
The theoretical literature on micronance almost exclusively focuses on the role of miss-
ing credit market for poor women who lack any collaterizable assets. The poor households
and, in particular poor women, in villages of developing countries, however, face a multitude
of other missing or imperfect markets (where markets exist); missing labor market being
one of the salient cases. It is important to understand the role of other missing markets,
because if only the credit market is missing with all other markets functioning properly,
the resulting resource allocation is Pareto-e¢ cient. This paper explores the implications of
missing (or imperfect) female labor market for the micronance movement.2 Our analysis
shows that missing or imperfect labor market may be a key to understanding some of the
most important and intensely debated issues facing the micronance movement today, in-
cluding the high interest rate, di¢ culties in scaling up small scale home-based micronance
activities to small and medium scale enterprises, and supposedly low interest rate elasticity
of demand for micronance loans.
The interest rates charged by the micronance NGOs are much higher compared to the
interest rates charged by formal banks; 30-60 percent annual interest rate is common in
micronance loans. In some instances, it can be more than 100 percent.3 The critiques
of high interest rates argue that these rates are usurious(MFIs are neo-moneylenders
in this view), but the proponents point out that such high interest rates are necessary to
recover the costs incurred in intensive village level administration of small scale loans. The
2Although we couch the discussion in terms of female labor market, the main conclusions are gender-
neutral, as long as the labor market is missing or characterized by signicant transactions costs.
3According to one source, the average micronance interest rates in Asia- Pacic countries are between
30 percent to 70 percent (Fernando, 2006).
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high interest rates charged in microcredit have become a focal point of recent debate, with
policy makers in some countries imposing a ceiling on interest rates. The literature on
high interest rates in microcredit has so far concentrated primarily on the question of why
competition among NGOs is not driving down the interest rates. Our focus here is di¤erent:
we are interested in understanding how poor women can repay these high interest rate loans
even though they cannot reap any economies of scale (typical rst loan is $50-$200, and
repayment rate is more than 90 percent in most of the MFIs). How can micro activities
such as backyard chicken raising yield more than 50-60 percent rate of return when the
returns to large scale vertically integrated poultry farms are in the range of 20-30 percent?4
Interestingly, the recent estimates in fact show that the returns to capital can be very
high in small and medium enterprises in developing countries (de Mel et al (2008, 2009),
Banerjee and Duo (2005, 2008)). But the evidence also shows that there are important
heterogeneity in the returns; they depend on the gender and entrepreneurial ability. The
returns to the investments undertaken by women is, in general, much lower than that to
the investments undertaken by men, thus deepening the puzzle of millions of poor women
successfully repaying high interest rate loans. The evidence also shows that the credit
(grant) interventions fail to increase employment.5 Also, as noted by Banerjee (2004) and
Banerjee and Duo (2005), persistent misallocation of capital can give rise to pockets of
very high returns, even though the average rate of return to capital is not very high in
a developing country. The di¢ culty in explaining the high repayment rates with high
interest rates in microcredit programs arises from the fact that millions of poor women
seem to generate very high returns to very small investments, the high returns are not
conned to a subset of microentrepreneurs with exceptional ability. Although there can be
alternative explanations for high rate of returns to micro investments, we investigate the
possible role played by labor market imperfections. The analysis provided here complements
the existing explanations that focus on other factors such as the shape of the production
function and short gestation or production cycle (see Aghion and Morduch (2010), CGAP
(1996)).6
4The available evidence on the returns to large and small scale poultry farming in developing countries
shows that returns are much higher for large scale vertically integrated poultry farms (see, for example,
Ara Begum (2005) on Bangladesh, NBARD (2005) on Uttar Pradesh, India). According to the estimates
presented in an evaluation of poultry farming in 2005 by National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment (NBARD) in Uttar Pradesh, India, net nancial return is 14 percent for a 500 birds farm compared
to 24 percent for a 1000 birds farm. There is also evidence that the net return is negative for small poultry
farms.
5As we discuss later, this lack of employment e¤ects is an implication of the theoretical analysis devel-
oped in this paper.
6Our focus here is on the returns to micro-investments. This assumes that the credit from MFIs goes to
start a new business or to expand existing business (productive activity). However, as widely recognized
in the literature, microcredit may be used for many other purposes, including weathering negative shocks
(insurance market is missing), and to nance indivisible purchases such as consumer durables (missing
consumer credit market). In such cases, the borrower presumably repays the loan by taping into other
income sources.
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An important argument against the microcredit programs is that they may trap entre-
preneurs with small scale ine¢ cient projects, and thus may hinder the structural change
in the economy.7 The micronance programs have found it di¢ cult to scale up the loans
to make the transition from small scale household activities to medium and large scale
operations.
The recent experience of some of the most prominent microcredit NGOs such as BRAC
in Bangladesh shows that the scaling up of the loan size may not be easy, as most of
the microentrepreneurs may not be willing to take larger loans at the going interest rate.
For example, the small and medium enterprise (SME) loan program of BRAC failed to
attract borrowers from the existing microcredit client pool. When the existing microcredit
borrowers were allowed to take larger loans, to the surprise of BRAC loan o¢ cers, a large
proportion of them declined it. This unwillingness (or inability) to scale up the investment
projects appears especially puzzling when one tries to square it up with the presumed high
rate of returns to the micro investments as discussed above. The results from our analysis
show that, even in the absence of diminishing returns in the technology, a microentrepreneur
may not nd it protable to expand the scale of operation beyond a threshold when the
labor market is imperfect or missing. To be sure, the lack of demand for larger loans can
also be due to other factors such as risk aversion in the absence of functioning insurance
markets, and lack of demand for the products of microenterprises in isolated local markets.8
Our analysis brings the focus on the role played by imperfect or missing labor market which
has been largely ignored in both the academic and policy discussions on microcredit.
In recent years, a lot of discussion on microcredit has centered on the desirability of high
interest rates for reducing dependence on donor subsidy in microcredit programs. More
importantly, it has been widely argued by the micronance NGOs and their supporters
that such high interest rate does not have any signicant negative e¤ect on the borrowers.
For the the poor clients served by the micronance, the argument goes, it is the access not
the cost (interest rate) that matters (see, for example, CGAP, 1996, Robinson, 2001). The
implicit assumption being that the interest rate elasticity of demand for microcredit is close
to zero.9 If this assumption is correct, one can argue that a high interest rate is desirable
for the expansion of microcredit coverage. However, this practitioners wisdomof a close
to zero interest rate elasticity appears rather unusual to an economist. In an interesting
7As the argument goes: no country can reach a per capita income of $10000 by raising chicken in the
backyard, or making clothes in small scale handlooms (as is done in Grameen Check in Bangladesh).
8The MFIs are well aware of the implications of missing insurance markets and lack of market integration.
For example, the BRAC in Bangladesh started a project to connect the microcredit borrowers who bought
cows to the urban markets in Bangladesh. BRACs project collects and pasteurizes the milk, and supplies
it to the urban centers under their own brand name Aarong Milk. BRAC started the Aarong Milk
project after the borrowers complained that no one in the village wants to buy milk, but everyone wants
to sell, thus causing a glut in the local market. But there were no private traders who came forward to
ll in the missing marketing institutions.
9This argument is about e¢ ciency costs of higher interest rate. Even with zero interest rate elasticity,
the welfare of the existing borrowers are negatively a¤ected when interest rate is increased.
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paper, Dehejia et. al. (2007), in fact, show that the interest elasticity of microcredit
loans is signicantly negative. This poses the puzzle, then why the practitioners tend to
believe that the interest rate elasticity is very low, practically close to zero? Our analysis
provides a possible explanation of this disjoint between the practitioners wisdomand
the econometric evidence.
While the labor market is, in general, underdeveloped in the developing countries,
characterized by signicant unemployment and segmentation (Basu (1997), Ray (1998),
Dasgupta (1993), Bardhan (1984), Mammen and Paxson (2000)), the formal labor market
for women is essentially non-existent.10 As noted by Mammen and Paxson (2000), ...there
may be costs associated with women working outside of the domain of the family farm
or nonfarm family enterprise. ...Custom and social norms may also limit the ability of
women to accept paid employment, specially in manual jobs. Finally, o¤-farm jobs may
be less compatible with child rearing, creating xed costs of working o¤farm(P. 143). In
addition, the lack of a well-developed market for prepared meals, and absence of mechanized
substitutes for household work (such as dishwasher and laundry) may add to the cost of
participation in the formal labor market by women (especially when the consumer credit for
durable goods is missing, as is the case in rural areas of most of the developing countries).
This implies that, in most of the cases, the household optimization treats female labor
endowment as e¤ectively non-traded.
Even where the market for female labor exists, the selling price (i.e., the e¤ective
wage rate after netting out monetary and non-monetary costs of participating in the out-
side labor market) is, in general, much lower than the buying price(i.e, the wage paid
by the employer), due to the transaction costs.11 The transactions costs include xed
costs associated with child rearing, and stigma because of social norms regarding womens
participation in the formal labor market (such as Purdah) along with the usual search,
information and monitoring costs (Sadoulet et. al., 1996, Amin, 1997). The existence of
a transaction cost band implies that many households fall within the band, and the fe-
male labor endowment becomes non-tradable for such a household (i.e., household specic
missing market for female labor).
Using a simple model that incorporates transaction costs in the labor market (missing
market being the extreme case), and heterogeneity in the households endowment of non-
labor resources (land), we show that:
(i) the surprising credit worthiness of poor microcredit borrowers facing very high inter-
10For example, according to estimates based on Ghana Living Standards Survey (1998/99), less than
one percent female have regular (formal) employment, and 56 percent are self-employed (Blunch (2006)).
This includes both rural and urban households. The estimates reported by Mammen and Paxson (2000)
for Cote dIvoire using 1988 Living standard measurement Survey indicate that only 5.6 percent of the
women did any work as employees(italic in original).
11Note that womens wage is much lower compared to that for men to begin with. According to the
estimates presented by Hossain and Bose (2004) for Bangladesh, womens average wage in agriculture was
58 percent of mens wage in 2000. When one factors in the costs of participation, the e¤ective wage (selling
price) becomes very low for women.
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est rate may be explained in terms of labor market imperfections. The maximum interest
rate that can be charged to a microentrepreneur without violating her participation con-
straint depends on two factors (a) the non-labor resource endowment of the household, and
(b) the width of the transaction cost band in the labor market in her village.
(ii) the transition from small-scale home based activities to the medium and large scale
operations may prove di¢ cult, if not impossible. Even with a constant returns technology,
the microentrepreneurs might not be willing to scale up their investment at a given interest
rate. This lack of demand for larger loans can be understood in terms of either (a) a
discontinuous increase in the wage rate faced by a household as it switches side in the labor
market turning into a net demander, or (b) a market structure induced diminishing returns
to capital for households that fall in the transaction cost band (see below).
(iii) consistent with the recent empirical evidence (Dehejia et. al., 2007), the interest
rate elasticity of demand for microcredit may be signicantly negative even though certain
groups of borrowers do not reduce their demand for credit facing a higher interest rate (the
practitioners wisdom).
(iv) the e¤ectiveness of progressive lending as an instrument of contract enforcement
(dynamic incentives) is likely to depend on the households location in the labor market
with regards to the transaction cost band.
The analysis presented here has important implications for the appropriate role of micro-
credit in developing countries. Perhaps the most important implication is that, as womens
labor market in developing countries become more developed, most of the collateral-poor
women may nd it more attractive to work in the labor market than become a microen-
treprenur that relies on the household labor. This means that while microcredit can play
a vital role in creating economic opportunities for women when womens labor market is
underdeveloped, it may lose its appeal in the longer term. In this sense, microcredit cannot
be a long term development strategy.12
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section lays out the basic model
of the economy, for concreteness called Grameen Economy.13 Section (3) analyzes the
logic of credit worthiness at extremely high interest rates by looking at the participation
constraint of a household that critically depends on the non-labor resources available to a
household and the structure of the labor market. We use the Neoclassicallabor market
without any transaction costs as the benchmark. The following section (i.e., section 4)
explains the puzzle of a lack of demand for larger loans by focusing on the diminishing
returns to capital caused by the non-traded female labor. Section (5) discusses the
12However, micronance movement has grown out of microcredit and has increasingly focused on a
variety of products including savings and micro-insurance. For example, Grameen Bank o¤ers education
loans, and housing loans to its members. Explicit insurance features are built into the Grameen II program
where a borrower facing a negative shock can renegotiate the repayment. It is possible that even in the
longer term when both formal credit market deepens and womens labor market develops, micronance
may retain a niche market focusing on these products.
13In Bengali, Grameenmeans rural. The most famous micronance program Grameen Bankof
Bangladesh thus means rural bank.
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response to a higher interest rate by households depending on their location relative to the
transaction cost band in the labor market. Section (6) traces out the implications of a
transaction cost band in the labor market for e¢ cacy of dynamic incentive schemes that
rely on loan size as a disciplining mechanism. The paper concludes with a summary of
the results and a discussion of their implications for the appropriate role of microcredit in
long run development of a developing economy.
(2) The Model
The Grameen economy consists of a continuum of households indexed by the non-labor
resources owned by a household. For simplicity and concreteness, we lump together all the
di¤erent non-labor resources and call it land (denoted as H ). H is distributed uniformly
over the unit interval [0; 1].14 This implies that we include the landless households as an
equally important group.15 To focus on the role of the labor market, and for the sake
of tractability, we assume that there is no land market.16 This can be thought of as
only approximately valid, and can be partly justied in terms of the empirical evidence
that the land market is very thin with little or no transactions in most of the developing
countries (Ho¤ et al. (1993)). Each household is endowed with a xed amount of female
labor, denoted as Lf . The labor is supplied inelastically and thus we abstract from the
labor-leisure trade-o¤.
We build the analysis on a simple general equilibrium model of households facing trans-
actions costs in the female labor market. We adopt the standard approach to modeling
transaction costs in terms of a transactions cost band that creates a wedge between the
buying (paid by the employer) and selling (received by the household) price of female la-
bor, with the buying price (denoted as (1 + 2)w) higher than the selling price (denoted
as (1  1)w).17 This approach to modeling transaction costs in a market owes its origin
to the early contributions in the general equilibrium models with transaction cost such as
Foley (1970), Hahn (1971), and is now widely used in the literature on agricultural house-
hold modeling (see, Singh et. al. 1986 for early contributions, and de Janvry and Sadoulet
(1999) for a recent survey). On the supply side, the transaction costs (1) reect, among
other things, the costs of information and search in the labor market. They also include,
especially for women, more intangible costs of participating in the formal labor market
arising from religious or social customs like Purdah.18 An alternative interpretation, not
14This assumption about the distribution of resources in the economy is for simplicity and does not a¤ect
the central results of the paper.
15In more realistic case, the land distribution will have a mass point at zero, as the proportion of landless
may be signicant in a given developing country. However, the central results derived in the paper are
not sensitive to such modication in the land distribution.
16When there is no credit available (i.e., no MFI operating in the village), a well functioning land market
would lead to Pareto e¢ cient allocation even if the labor market is missing. In this case, missing labor
market has e¢ ciency implications only if the land market is not working properly or completely missing.
17As noted by Foley (1970) in his seminal paper on general equilibrium model with transaction costs it
is not possible to have an equilibrium with higher selling price.
18Although Purdah is usually associated with the veil a woman wears, as noted by Amin (1997), it is
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pursued in this paper, is that 1 is the unemployment rate in an appropriate model of un-
employment, such as search and/or e¢ ciency wage (Mirrlees (1975), Stiglitz (1976)), and
thus (1  1)w can be interpreted as the expected wage faced by a household factoring in
the unemployment rate when it looks for an outside employment. We leave the analysis
of unemployment for a future occasion, and assume that the labor market clears at the
equilibrium wage rate. On the demand side, the transaction cost in employing hired labor,
2, reects the costs due to monitoring to control moral hazard. However, to make the
central points of the paper, it su¢ ces to focus on the transactions costs in the supply side
of the market, and our analysis will thus ignore the demand side transactions costs in the
labor market, and for rest of the paper we set 2 = 0. To keep the model simple, we assume
that the transaction costs are iceberg costsfamiliar from the economic geography (Fujita,
Krugman, Venables (2001)). This allows us to ignore the complications that arise from the
need for keeping track of the income generated in the transactions sectorof the economy.
We believe that this is an appropriate simplifying assumption for a developing economy
where there is little or no specialized employment agencies that match the employer with
a potential employee.19
There are two commodities that can be produced by a household: rice (denoted as a
for agriculture) and poultry (denoted as cfor chicken). The production of rice needs land
and labor, while the production of poultry only requires capital and labor. The production
functions are constant returns:
Qa = H
L1 fa ;  2 (0; 1) and Qc = KL1 fc ;  2 (0; 1)
where K is the capital used in poultry production, and Lfa and Lfc are the labor used in
the production of rice and poultry respectively.
The rice is chosen as the numeraire good, and the relative price of poultry is denoted
as Pc: To simplify the analysis, we assume that both of the commodities are tradables and
their prices are determined at the world market. A household maximizes its income given
its land and labor endowment and given the price vector. The households do not have
access to credit market in the absence of a micronance NGO program.
We consider the e¤ects of both small and large scale microcredit interventions in the
Grameen economy. The small interventionanalysis will be appropriate for the case where
only a single household or a small proportion of households in the Grameen economy get
microcredit, and thus there is no perceptible impact of the credit intervention on labor
market equilibrium, and wage response is negligible. We can ignore the implications of
general equilibrium wage response for such an analysis. The formal results below for the
better understood as a set of complex social norms that enforce womens economic and social seclusion
and make it costly for them to participate in the market.
19An alternative approach to modeling imperfections is to specify the transaction costs in terms of
labor used by the households in search, monitoring etc. For general equilibrium analysis that adopts this
approach, see, for example, Kurz (1974), and for an interesting application to agrarian organization in
developing countries, see Eswaran and Kotwal (1985)).
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small intervention case are derived in the specic context of a marginal intervention for a
single household, but the results are relevant for any intervention small enough to leave
the equilibrium wage essentially unchanged. The formal analysis for the large scale inter-
vention focuses on the case of global intervention where every household in the Grameen
economy gets credit. The results and insights from this polar case are, however, useful for
understanding the e¤ects of any large scale intervention that a¤ects the equilibrium wage
signicantly.20
Household Optimization
The household optimization depends on whether or not it has access to microcredit. A
household with landH can potentially allocate its labor endowment (Lf ) among alternative
options: produce rice, produce chicken (if it gets credit), and sell labor to the market.
Consider a household that participates in the microcredit program (K; r) : Note that we
assume that the household does not have a choice about the loan size k, and is o¤ered a
credit contract (K; r) as a take it or leave it. This is a good description of the micronance
credit market, especially for the rst time borrowers. The optimization problem faced by
a household is as follows:
MaxLfa;Lfc Y = H
L1 fa + PcK
L1 fc + w [Lf   (Lfa + Lfc)]  (1 + r)K (1)
where w is shadow wage rate faced by the household and it depends on its location relative to
the transaction cost band. If it is a net supplier of labor, then w = (1 1) ~w; and w = ~w for
a net buyer of labor from the market, and ~w is market clearing wage rate. For a household
that does not have access to microcredit K = 0 = Lfc, and for a landless household H = 0:
Denote the optimal labor allocation choices by Lfc and L

fa: The household participates in
a microcredit program (K; r); only if the maximum income is higher with the microcredit
compared to the maximum income without microcredit. Dene the following maximum
income function:
Y (H; w;K; r; Pc) = H
 
Lfa
1 
+PcK

 
Lfc
1 
+ w

Lf  
 
Lfa + L

fc
  (1+ r)K (2)
So a household H participates in the microcredit program (K; r), if the following holds:
Y (H; w;K; r; Pc)  Y (H; w; 0; r; Pc) ; Participation Constraint (3)
Note that when labor market is missing, the shadow wage rates above will di¤er across
two sides of inequality (3).
Labor Market Clearing
20Kaboski and Townsend (forthcoming) provide evidence that the large scale intervention in Thailand
called Million Baht Fund a¤ected the equilibrium wage signicantly.
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The equilibrium wage rate ~w is determined from the following labor market clearing
condition: Z 1
0

Lfa ( ~w;H; ) + Lfc ( ~w;H; )

dH = Lf (4)
(3) Economics of High Interest Rate
(3.1) Missing Female Labor Market
To understand the implications of heterogeneous shadow price of labor across di¤erent
households in its pristine form, we rst compare the two polar cases: (i) the missing labor
market (1 = 1), and (ii) the Neoclassical labor market (1 = 0).
21 We show that a
household will be willing to pay a higher interest rate when there is no labor market for
female labor compared to a benchmark of the Neoclassical labor market if its land holding
is smaller than a threshold and the loan size o¤ered by the micronance NGO is not too
large. The results derived under the assumption of a missing female labor market, however,
apply to the more general case where there are transaction costs in the labor market, and
one is considering the households that fall within the transaction costs band.
Proposition 1(Marginal Intervention With a Missing Market)
Consider a marginal credit intervention by an NGO in the Grameen economy where a
single household with land holding H gets credit K > 0: There exists critical thresholds
H^ 2  0; 1
2

and K^ > 0 such that the maximum feasible interest rate (i.e., the interest rate
an NGO can charge without violating the participation constraint) is higher if the female
labor market is missing compared to the Neoclassical benchmark, if H  H^ and K < K^:
Proof:
By assumption, the credit intervention is marginal. So the market clearing wage rate
before and after the credit intervention is same for the Neoclassical case (denoted as w).
Denote the maximum interest rate the household H wants to pay when facing w in a
zero transactions cost competitive labor market as r(H) which is is determined by the
participation constraint:
Y (H;w; K; r(H); Pc) = Y (H;w; 0; r(H); Pc) (5)
which implies: r(H) = P
1

c
"
(1  )
w
 1 

#
  1 (6)
where w =
1  
(2Lf )
(7)
21We emphasize here that even though a completely missing female labor market is clearly an abstraction,
it is not an unrealistic one when only one percent of female labor have regular employment outside the
household, as is the case in Ghana noted before.
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Unsurprisingly, with a competitive labor market, the maximum interest rate does not de-
pend on the land owned by a household.
In the missing market case, the household faces a shadow price for labor ( w) which
changes after the credit intervention. Denote the shadow prices of female labor as 1 (no
credit) and 2 (with credit). When the labor market is missing, the maximum interest
rate a household H is willing to pay is denoted as r0(H) which is determined from the
participation constraint:
r0(H) =
H

1 
2
 1 
  

1 
1
 1 


K
+ P
1

c

1  
2
 1 

  1 (8)
The shadow prices 1 and 2 are determined by the following internal labor market
clearing conditions: 
1  
1
 1

H = Lf (9)
1  
2
 1

H +

(1  )Pc
2
 1

K = Lf (10)
It is obvious from equations (9) and (10) above that 2 > 1:
Now consider the household with the lowest land size, i.e., a landless household (H = 0).
In this case, a su¢ cient condition for r0(0) > r(0) to hold is that the loan size K satises
the following:
K < K^ =  
1
1 

1  
(1  )2Pc
 1

L
 

f (11)
The above inequality follows from equations (6) and (8), and from the observation that the
shadow prices for labor for a landless household can be solved as follows:
1 = 0; and 2 = [(1  )Pc]

K
Lf

(12)
For rest of the discussion here, assume that K < K^: Now we show that r0
 
1
2

<
r
 
1
2

and thus H^ 2  0; 1
2

where H^ such that r0

H^

= r

H^

. To establish r0
 
1
2

<
r
 
1
2

, we rely on the observation that for a household H = 1
2
; the maximum interest
rate household wants to pay is same for the following two cases: (i) missing market with
marginal intervention and (ii) global intervention (where every household gets credit) in
a Neoclassical labor market; i.e., r0
 
1
2

= rg
 
1
2

; where rg denotes the maximum interest
rate under a global microcredit intervention in a neoclassical labor market (see proposition
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(3.a) below).22 Then the proof follows from the observation that the maximum interest rate
in a Neoclassical market is higher under marginal intervention compared to a global credit
intervention, i.e., r
 
1
2

> rg(
1
2
): This last inequality follows from equation (6) above, and
from the fact that wg > w
, where wg is equilibrium wage under global credit intervention.
Now it is easy to check that the following holds:
@r
@H
= 0 8H and @r
0
@H
< 0 8H , because 2 > 1 (13)
So it follows that r0(H) > r(H) 8H 2 (0; H^): QED
Although it is not possible to get a closed form solution for the threshold landholding
H^ , we can derive a stricter bound ~H < H^ so that 8H < ~H we have r0 (H) > r (H) : The
bound ~H is dened as 2( ~H) = w: Intuitively, given the loan size K, the household ~H is
self-su¢ cient both under the missing market and a Neoclassical labor market. However, the
reservation income is higher in the neoclassical case as 1 < 2( ~H) = w: From equations
(7) and (10), we have the following:
~H =
1
2
 K

Pc
(1  )
(1  )
 1

(2Lf )
 
 (14)
Note that ~H > 0, if K is not too large.
Discussion on Proposition 1
Proposition (1) above provides us with the main results for understanding the will-
ingness of poor women to take high interest rate microcredit loans and successfully repay
them.23 The intuition behind the results is simple. When the labor market is missing,
the shadow wage of labor without credit is very low in a household when it owns little or
no land (In our simple model shadow price of labor of landless household is zero). Access
to microcredit enables the labor within the household to be productive, even though the
outside labor market is missing. When a household considers an o¤er to join a microcredit
program, it values labor at the very low shadow wage, and thus the net income gain from
access to microcredit is much higher than would be indicated by the marginal product of
capital in micro activities undertaken by poor women. The women are thus willing to pay
very high interest rate for access to such loans.
The intuition behind the thresholds imposed on the land endowment and the loan size is
as follows. The condition thatK < K^ ensures that the loan size is not so high that it makes
a landless households shadow price of labor under missing market too high compared to
22Note that by denition the interest rate has to be low (if no price discrimination), or heterogeneous
across households in a global credit intervention to satisfy the participation constraints.
23In this paper, we abstract away from the issues related to strategic default. We assume that the
household do not repay only if it does not have enough returns to the project.
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the neoclassical equilibrium wage. If K > K^; a landless household would hire labor from
the market (under the Neoclassical case), because its shadow price of labor is now higher
than the market equilibrium wage w: Thus, with K > K^; a landless household would reap
higher income in a Neoclassical labor market, as it gains from the lower wage in the market
compared to its shadow price (assuming that the shadow price with credit is high enough).
The condition that H < H^ < 1
2
captures the idea that the shadow price of labor
before the credit intervention is low only for relatively land-poor households, and they
have the most to gain from access to credit (especially because the MFIs do not price
discriminate on the basis of non-labor resource endowment). Given any level of K < K^,
there exists a household H < 1
2
, for which the credit intervention would make the shadow
price of labor su¢ ciently higher than the Neoclassical equilibrium wage w so that the
households maximum income would be higher under the perfect market case. To see
this note that the shadow price of labor for the household H = 1
2
in the absence of credit
is equal to the neoclassical equilibrium wage w, i.e, 1
 
H = 1
2

= w: This implies that
even an arbitrarily small amount of capital K > 0 would make its shadow price higher
than w: The reservation income (maximum income in the absence of credit) is same for
H = 1
2
under both market structures, but, with credit, the household attains higher income
under a Neoclassical market as it can hire more labor and expand poultry production. By
continuity, it then follows that there exists a H^ 2 ( ~H; 1
2
) such that credit intervention
(K < K^) makes its shadow price higher than the Neoclassical wage, i.e, 2

K; H^

> w;
and the shadow price without credit is lower, i.e, 1(H^) < w, so that the maximum
interest rate the household H^ is willing to pay is same across missing labor market and the
Neoclassical labor market: The upshot of the above discussion is that, as long as the loan
size is not too large and the microcredit programs target relatively land-poor households,
a microcredit borrower will be willing to pay higher interest rate when labor market is
missing compared to the case when labor market is perfect with zero transactions costs.
The restrictions on the landholding and the loan size needed for the validity of propo-
sition 1 are likely to be satised in a typical microcredit program. For example, a major
eligibility criterion in the pioneering Grameen Bank microcredit program is that the house-
holds land ownership can not exceed 0.5 acre, and the land ownership cut-o¤ is 0.10 acre
for the Targetting Ultrapoor Program of BRAC, the largest NGO in Bangladesh. The
loan size in a typical microcredit program is also very small, usually in the range of US
$50- US $200.
One interesting implication of the above analysis is that it is the poorest segment of
the population (in terms of non-labor resource endowment) who are willing to pay the
most for access to credit. This follows directly from the comparative static result that
dr0
dH
< 0: There is some evidence that, in fact, it is the relatively land-poor households who
participate in such programs (Khandker, 1998). This implication of the model, although
intuitive, runs counter to the widely discussed observation that the standard microcredit
13
programs are unable to reach the poorest of the poor, i.e., the so-called ultra poor.24
We, however, note that the non-participation of ultra poor can be understood in terms of
our model if we introduce heterogeneity in the labor endowment. If the e¤ectivelabor
endowment varies across households due to di¤erences in human capital, especially health
(for example, nutrition e¢ ciency wage e¤ects), then the ultra poor can be thought of as the
segment of population that lacks in e¤ective labor endowment (bad health and low work
capacity). A lower e¤ective labor endowment implies that the maximum interest rate a
household is willing to pay and still accept the membership of micronance program is also
lower. As a result, an ultra poor household might fail to participate in (or be excluded
from) both the credit and labor markets.25
Global Credit Intervention With Missing Labor Market
The discussion so far focused on a case where the coverage of the credit intervention
is small enough so that it does not a¤ect the labor market equilibrium in the Neoclassical
benchmark. This is probably a good description of the micronance industry in many
African countries where the MFI penetration is still very low. But in some countries such
as Bangladesh and Bolivia, this assumption may not be tenable for a signicant number of
villages. In this section we analyze the maximum interest rates household wants to pay
under the missing market and the Neoclassical market assuming that every household gets
credit. The main results are stated below in proposition (2).
Proposition 2 (Global Intervention with a Missing Labor Market)
Consider the global intervention where a micronance NGO provides credit K > 0 to
every household in the Grameen economy. The maximum interest rate a household is willing
to pay for microcredit membership under a missing labor market is
(2:a) equal to the maximum interest rate under a Neoclassical labor market if H = 1
2
;
(2:b) higher than the maximum interest rate under a Neoclassical labor market if H < 1
2
.
Proof:
(2.a) First, note that for a household with landholding H = 1
2
the shadow wage rates
1 and 2 are equal to the corresponding Neoclassical market clearing wage rates (w and
wg). This can be seen by comparing the equations (9)-(10) to the following market clearing
24However, there is some recent evidence that shows that the standard microcredit programs in
Bangladesh have reached signicant numbers of ultra-poor. In a recent analysis using a large data set
(more than 280000 households) from three districts in Northern Bangladesh, Berg and Emran (2011) nd
that among the ultra-poor (owning less than 0.10 acre of land), micronance membership is almost 40
percent.
25For a formal treatment along these lines, see Emran et. al. (2009).
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conditions under the Neoclassical case: 
1  
w
 1
 1
2
= Lf (15)
1  
wg
 1
 1
2
+

(1  )Pc
wg
 1

K = Lf (16)
This implies that the household with H = 1
2
is self-su¢ cient in labor in the Neoclassical
case both before and after the credit intervention. As a consequence, it behaves as if the
labor market is missing. This implies that the maximum interest rate the household wants
to pay for the credit is same for the missing market and Neoclassical cases. QED
(2.b) First, we prove that for a household H < 1
2
the shadow prices of labor with and
without credit 2 and 1 satisfy the following:
1 < w
 ; 2 < wg (17)
(2   1) >
 
wg   w

(18)
The inequalities in (17) follow directly from a comparison of the Neoclassical market
clearing conditions and the self-su¢ ciency conditions (i.e., market clearing in the internal
labor market) in case of the missing market.
To prove inequality (18), consider the household with H = 1
2
   where  > 0 is
arbitrarily small. For such a household, the inequality (18) follows from the observation
that starting from the case H = 1
2
(and thus 1 = w ; 2 = wg), a marginal reduction in
the landholding reduces the demand for labor in the internal labor marketmore in the
absence of credit compared to the case of a microcredit intervention. This follows from
the following (denoting the labor demand in the internal labor market by L0D):
@L0D(no credit)
@H
jH= 1
2
=

1  
w
 1

>

1  
wg
 1

=
@L0D(credit)
@H
jH= 1
2
; because wg > w

To restore balance in the internal labor market, the shadow price of labor has to decline
more when there is no credit compared to the case with credit, thus yielding inequality
(18). The argument now applies a fortiori when we start from any arbitrary H 2  0; 1
2

:
Now note that we can treat a household under missing market as if it is facing the
perfect labor market with the parametric market wage rates 1 and 2. This observation
allows us to write the gap between the maximum interest rates a household H wants to pay
under alternative labor market arrangements and a global credit intervention as follows:
r0g(H)  rg(H) = 
H + 
K + 
L where

H =
H
K
("
1  
2
 1 

 

1  
1
 1 

#
 
"
1  
wg
 1 

 

1  
w
 1 

#)
< 0

K = P
1

c
(
1  
2
 1 

 

1  
wg
 1 

)
> 0 ; 
L =
Lf
K

[2   1] 

wg   w
	
> 0
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For a landless household, we have 
H = 0 and thus r0g(H = 0)  rg(H = 0) > 0: Now it
is easy to check that the gap between the maximum interest rates
 
r0g(H)  rg(H)

declines
monotonically as the land size increases, and by proposition (2.a), the gap becomes zero at
H = 1
2
: This implies that
 
r0g(H)  rg(H)

> 0 8H < 1
2
: QED
In intuitive terms 
H is the di¤erence in maximum income between the missing market
and the Neoclassical case due to agriculture (rice production), 
K is the di¤erence attribut-
able to microcredit nanced activity (poultry production) and 
L shows the di¤erence in
income due to general equilibrium wage response through the labor market.
Discussion on Proposition 2
Proposition 2 tells us that, under global intervention (compared to a marginal interven-
tion), households with relatively higher land endowment are willing to pay higher interest
rate when labor market is missing (compared to the Neoclassical benchmark). To see this
observe that ~Hg = 12 > H^; where
~Hg is dened such that 2

~Hg

= wg ; and H^ was dened
earlier in the proof of proposition (1) above. So a household with land H 2 (H^; 1
2
] will be
willing to pay higher interest rate for microcredit under missing market if the credit inter-
vention is global, but would not pay higher interest rate if credit intervention is marginal.
Although proposition 2 deals with the polar case of global intervention, the insight is more
general. Let  be the proportion of households covered by a microcredit intervention, and
w() the corresponding equilibrium wage (so that w( = 0) = w in the Neoclassical
labor market). Dene ~H() such that 2

~H(

) = w(); then it is easy to show that
@( ~H()
@
> 0: Thus any intervention that increases the equilibrium wage would also make
it worthwhile for some households with relatively better land endowment to pay higher
interest rate for credit when labor market is missing (compared to a Neoclassical market),
but not under marginal intervention that leaves wage undisturbed.
(3.2) Labor Market With A Transaction Cost Band
We now turn to the case where there is a market for female labor but there is a wedge
between the buying and selling price due to transaction costs. The following Lemma on the
relative magnitude of wage faced by the land poor households (neoclassical vs. transaction
cost) will be useful for the results.
Lemma 1
(1   1) ~w < w, where the wage rate ~w clears the labor market given the transaction
costs 1 > 0.
Proof:
See the appendix.
What Lemma 1 states is that the net wage rate faced by a household who is a net seller
of labor in the market is lower when the female labor market is characterized by transaction
costs 1 > 0 compared to the Neoclassical labor market with zero transactions costs.
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Proposition 3 (Marginal Intervention With a Transaction Cost Band)
Consider a marginal credit intervention in the Grameen economy characterized by trans-
actions costs 1 in the female labor market where an NGO provides credit K > 0 to a single
household with land size H: The maximum feasible interest rate (i.e., the interest rate the
NGO can charge without violating the participation constraint) depends on the span of the
transaction cost band and the location of the household relative to the band.
Assume that H is such that the household remains a net supplier of labor after the credit
intervention. For such a household
(3.a) the maximum feasible interest rate under transactions cost rts(H) is higher than
the maximum interest rate under Neoclassical benchmark r(H);
(3.b) the gap between the maximum interest rates i.e., rts(H)  r(H) is a positive
function of the transactions cost 1.
Proof:
Please see the appendix.
Discussion on Proposition 3
The intuition for proposition (3.a) is simple. For a household that remains a net seller
of labor after the credit intervention in an imperfect labor market (1 > 0), the shadow
price of labor is (1   1) ~w, both before and after the intervention. Now lemma 1 above
establishes that (1  1) ~w < w: Thus the labor cost is lower in an imperfect market, and
the household uses more labor in poultry production and reaps higher total prot given
the same amount of credit. Thus a household is willing to pay higher interest rate under
imperfect labor market, compared to the case of perfect labor market with zero transactions
costs.
The result in proposition (3.b) is easy to understand once we establish that the net
wage rate faced by a household that is a net seller in the market is a negative function of
the transactions cost parameter 1 (see the formal proof in the appendix): A labor market
characterized by higher transactions costs implies that the shadow price of labor is lower
for a household that sells labor. Then the result follows from proposition (3.a).
Note also that a higher transactions cost implies that the shadow price of labor in the
absence of credit (1) for more households fall within the transactions cost band, i.e, the
number of household such that 1(H) 2 [ (1 1) ~w; ~w] is a positive function of transactions
cost 1: This follows from the fact that
@ ~w
@1
> 0 (see appendix) along with the result used
above that the net wage rate (1 1) ~w is a negative function of 1: For the set of households
that fall within the transactions costs band, the analysis of maximum interest rate is given
by the results in proposition (1) above. In the polar case, when 1 = 1, there is no supply
of labor to the market, and labor market breaks down completely, and we have exactly the
set-up studied in proposition (1).
The above results are simple, but they have profound implications for the microcredit
movement. Perhaps the most important implication comes out of proposition (3:b) which
shows that a household will be willing to pay progressively lower interest rate for microcre-
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dit membership as the labor market develops, and changes in social norms and technological
improvements reduce the cost of womens labor force participation, and transaction costs
1 goes down as a result. Also, in our simple model, there is no role for human capital.
But in a more general analysis, net return from participating in the labor market will go
up as women acquire more human capital, thus making microcredit at high interest rates
less attractive.
Observe that even though the proposition (3) above deals with the households that are
net supplier of labor after the credit intervention, it is important from a policy perspective
because such households constitute the bulk of micronance target groups. Thus the impli-
cations derived from the analysis above are relevant for most of the microcredit borrowers,
especially because we include the households that fall in the transactions cost band.
Microcredit Interventions With Initial Non-zero Coverage
Propositions (1)-(3) above deal with an initial equilibrium where there is no microcredit
intervention. This might be a good approximation for many villages in Africa where mi-
crocredit coverage is low. But for many villages in countries such as Bangladesh, Bolivia,
and India, it is more appropriate to think about an initial equilibrium were a signicant
proportion of households are already members of microcredit programs, ie.,  > 0 in the
initial equilibrium. It is thus important to understand the implications of new microcredit
interventions in such a context.
Denote the initial microcredit coverage by 0 and the corresponding equilibrium wage in
the Neoclassical market be w(0): Now consider a marginal increase in the coverage where
an MFI o¤ers loan K to a household H which is currently not member of any microcredit
program. The results above imply that a household with relatively higher land endowment
will be willing to pay higher interest rate in an imperfect labor market when 0 > 0 relative
to the case considered earlier where 0 = 0. This follows from the fact that the wage rate is
higher with positive coverage in the initial Neoclassical equilibrium, i.e., w(0) > w
 and
@ ~H0
@0
> 0; where ~H0 is dened such that 2( ~H0) = w(0): Note that ~H0 = ~H when 0 = 0
where ~H was dened earlier in equation (14) above.
Since @ ~H0
@0
> 0; households with progressively higher land endowment will remain net
sellers of labor after becoming micronance memebrs as 0 goes up. As a result, the set
of households for which proposition (3) is valid would expand and include relatively land-
rich households: We would thus expect to see the average microcredit borrower to become
richer (in terms of land endowment) as microcredit coverage expands and the micronance
market matures in a country. This might be (incorrectly) interpreted as a mission drift
on part of the MFIs, although the change in the composition of borrowers is not because
the MFI has changed its objective function, but because of the change in the composition
of the potential applicants for such loans.
A second important implication is that as the coverage increases (i.e,  increases), the
maximum interest rate a household H is willing to pay for microcredit in an imperfect
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market goes down progressively, because the market clearing wage rate ~w is higher in the
initial equilibrium.
(4) Scaling Up: Obstacles to Transition to Medium and Large Scale
(4.1) The Problem of Lack of Demand for Larger Loans
The prospects for and constraints on the transition from small-scale home-based ac-
tivities to medium and large scale operations in the micronance programs have, over the
years, attracted a lot of attention, especially from the practitioners. The issue is important
and germane to the broader question of whether micronance can be part of a develop-
ment strategy that helps an economy achieve signicant structural change. The critiques of
the micronance programs have noted that the small loan size typical in the micronance
programs is likely to constrain the microentrepreneurs to an ine¢ cient scale of operation.
There are two assumptions implicit in this argument. First, there is signicant increas-
ing returns in the projects undertaken by microcredit borrowers. The second underlying
assumption is that the expansion of the investment activities are credit constrained. It is
possible (may be plausible) that at least some of the activities undertaken by the microen-
trepreneurs exhibit increasing returns (Khandker (1998), Aghion and Morduch (2010)).
However, over last three decades, it has proven di¢ cult to make the transition from the
backyard enterprisesto small and medium enterprises in most of the microcredit programs
in poor developing countries. While loan ceilings imposed on the borrower can constrain
the scale of her operation, our focus here is on the possibility that the borrowers might not
demand larger loans when the labor market is missing or imperfect. The experience of some
prominent micronance organizations like BRAC in Bangladesh shows that the di¢ culties
in scaling up the investment projects, at least for certain type of microentrepreneurs, might
in fact be due to a lack of demand for larger loans rather than quantity rationing by the
micronance lenders. The evidence that a signicant proportion of microentrepreneurs do
not accept larger loans at the going interest rate seems puzzling. One can argue that such
lack of demand for larger loans may be due to the nature of production function where very
small loans yield extremely high returns (for example, Cobb-Douglas production function
satisfying Inada conditions), but larger loans face strong diminishing returns (Aghion and
Morduch (2010), CGAP (1996)). However, if the underlying technology is a constant
returns one, a plausible assumption for activities such as poultry and livestock raising, and
all other markets are competitive, it is not clear what is responsible for the diminishing
returns to capital; a microentrepreneur should be able to scale up the project when o¤ered
larger amount of loans, by hiring all the inputs from the relevant markets. In other words,
there is no obvious xed factor that forces diminishing returns to capital.26 This implies
26One can appeal to the xity of innate entrepreneurial capability that can result in diminishing returns.
While idiosyncratic and inalienable entrepreneurial capability can explain the (eventual) diminishing re-
turns, an explanation based on it fails to account for the credit worthiness of millions of poor women in
the villages of developing countries. It seems less than convincing that millions of women are endowed
with extraordinary entrepreneurial capability to generate very high returns required for the repayment of
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that the net rate of return on the investment should be independent of the scale, and depend
only on the parametric input and output prices faced by the microentrepreneur.27 Thus
the demand for credit should be unbounded at the going interest rate as long as the unit
cost of production is lower than the output price (with increasing returns, the argument
holds a fortiori). Thus the entrepreneur should be always credit constrained (in terms of
loan size). Our analysis can explain the puzzle of apparent absence of credit constraint
for certain households even though the production function is constant returns.
To focus on the issue of scaling up, in what follows, we assume that in setting the
interest rate the micronance NGO is dictated by the zero prot condition. The interest
rate charged by the NGO is denoted as r^ = r +  where r is the interest rate the NGO
pays for its funds (in most cases subsidized by donors) and  is the administration cost for
per unit of loans. We denote a microcredit contract o¤ered by an NGO by (K; r^) which
species the loan size given the interest rate r^.
Proposition 4 (Market Structure Induced Diminishing Returns to Capital)
Assume that the labor market in the Grameen economy is characterized by transaction
costs 1 and a micronance NGO o¤ers credit K > 0 to a single household with land size
H 2

0; H

where
H such that 1( H) = ~w =) H = Lf
(1 )
~w
 1

There exists threshold loan sizes Kd(H) > ~Kd(H) > 0 such that 8K 2

~Kd(H); Kd(H)

there is diminishing returns to capital. The loan size thresholds are a negative function of
the landholding of a household.
Proof:
The threshold loan sizes are determined by the following
2(H; ~Kd) = (1  1) ~w and 2(H; Kd) = ~w
The closed form solutions are:
~Kd(H) =
Lf  	aH
	c
; Kd(H) =
Lf   ~	aH
~	c
(19)
where ~	a =

1  
~w
 1

and ~	c =

1  
~w
 1

(20)
	a =

1  
(1  1) ~w
 1

and 	c =

1  
(1  1) ~w
 1

(21)
the high interest microcredit loans.
27In fact, one can argue that there is increasing returns in activities like poultry farming, because of xed
costs in both production and marketing. we discussed some evidence on increasing returns in integrated
poultry farming earlier in the paper.
20
It follows immediately from equations (19) that the threshold loan size beyond which
diminishing returns to capital set in is a negative function of the land endowment of a
household. Also, note that the threshold loan sizes are higher when the microcredit
intervention is global, as the equilibrium wage rate is higher in this case compared to the
marginal intervention, i.e., ~wg > ~w:
Discussion on Proposition 4
The basic insight behind the diminishing returns to capital is that when the shadow
price of labor of a household falls inside the transaction costs band of the labor market, the
female labor becomes a nontradable, and hence the xed household endowment of female
labor forces diminishing returns to capital. This can be seen most transparently in the
case of a landless household, because then the poultry production function for a household
inside the transaction cost band becomes
Qc = K
 L1 f ;  2 (0; 1)
where we have put a upper bar on Lf to underscore that once the household has employed
all its labor in poultry, it can not vary the amount of female labor at the going wage rate
(1  1) ~w: This implies that the returns to capital declines as long as the household stays
within the transaction cost band. We call this market structure induced diminishing
returns to capitalto emphasize that it is not a purely technological property due to the
production function. To be sure, the household can hire female labor from the market, but
only at the buying price ~w: This discontinuous jump in the e¤ective wage rate implies that
the microentrepreneur might nd it unprotable to accept a larger loan as the unit cost of
production at ~w might be more than the output price, even though it is protable when the
household is a net supplier of labor and thus the shadow price of labor is (1  1) ~w: Note
that for a household which owns land and nds itself within the transaction cost band, the
diminishing returns to capital in the poultry production is mitigated by an internal labor
market. The household keeps moving labor from rice farming to poultry production, and
thus the amount of labor available to poultry production is not xed, even though the total
labor available to the household is xed at the initial endowment as long as the household
stays within the transaction cost band. However, there is diminishing returns to capital in
the poultry production even for such a household because it increases the labor input less
than proportionately.
Proposition 5 (Lack of Demand for Larger Loans as a Constraint on Scaling
Up)
Assume that the transactions cost band in the labor market is such that the following
holds:
r^ [(1  1) ~w]1  < Pc < r^ [ ~w]1  (22)
(5.a) Then there exists a critical threshold of loan size Kp(H; r^) such that the house-
hold H declines the o¤er to become member of any credit program (K; r^) such that K >
Kp(H; r^):
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(5.b) Consider a household with land size H  0 who is already a member of the
microcredit program (K0; r^): Then there exists a maximum threshold of loan size Km(H; r^)
such that the household H declines any o¤er (K; r^) such that (K > Km(H; r^)).
(5.c) The maximum loan size for a member of micronance program is, in general, less
than the maximum loan size for a prospective member, i.e., Km(H; r^)  Kp(H; r^):
Proof and Discussion
First note that inequality (22) ensures that the demand for microcredit is not zero
or unbounded. Since r^ [(1  1) ~w]1  < Pc, a household nds it protable to accept
microcredit if it is a net supplier of labor. The second part of the inequality, i.e., Pc <
r^ [ ~w]1  implies that a household who is a net buyer of labor from the market makes loss
by taking microcredit. As noted before, even a landless household becomes a net buyer of
labor from the market when the loan size is large enough.
(5.a) The threshold loan size Kp(H; r^) is determined by the participation constraint:
H (Lf   Lfc)1  + Pc (Kp) L1 fc   (1 + r^)Kp = HL1 fa + (1  1) ~w [Lf   Lfa]
Since Lfc, the labor allocation to poultry, is a nonlinear function of Kp, it is, in general,
not possible to derive explicit solution for Kp: Note that Kp > ~Kd(H): However, Kp 7
Kd(H):
(5.b) For a household H who is a member of a microcredit program (K0; r^) ; the house-
hold accepts additional loan only if the current loan size K0 is smaller than the loan size
that maximizes its income when the household is within the transaction cost band and thus
faces diminishing returns to capital. Denote the maximum income of a household H by
Y 0(H; r^) where
Y 0(H; r^) =MaxK;Lfc

H (Lf   Lfc)1  + PcKL1 fc   (1 + r^)K
	
Using the two rst order conditions, we can solve for the following bound on the loan
size for a household with landholding H:
Km(H; r^) = Lf

1 + r^
Pc
  1
1 
 

(1  )Pc
1  
 1


(1 + r^)
Pc
  
(1 )
H (23)
This implies that if the micronance NGO o¤ers additional credit 4K0 > 0 the house-
hold will decline the o¤er if the following holds:
K0 +4K0 > Km
If K0 = Km to begin with, the household rejects any o¤er to scale up the investment.
In fact, such a household will contract the capital stock if possible.
(5.c) The proof follows immediately by observing that a new member will accept a loan
size Kn where Kn = Km+" where " > 0 is small enough. This is so because the household
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still makes positive total prot from poultry production (evaluated at the shadow price of
labor) and gets a higher wage income as the shadow price of labor is higher. In fact, a
household may accept the membership of a microcredit program (Kn; r^) even if it makes net
loss from poultry production when evaluated at the shadow wage rate. This can be seen
most transparently for a landless household. For a landless household, consider the case
where it is o¤ered a microcredit contract ( K; r^) such that ( K) = Pc   r^
h
2( K)
i1 
< 0
is arbitrarily small: So evaluated at the shadow wage rate, the household incurs loss from
the microcredit operation. However, it is still possible that the net income is higher with
microcredit compared to the case of pure wage labor. This happens when the following
holds: h
2( K)  (1  1) ~w
i
Lf + ( K)

KL1 f

> 0
where the rst term shows the gain income due to higher wage and the second term the
loss in income from poultry production.
The proposition (5.c) is important because it shows that it is more di¢ cult for a micro-
nance program to scale up the size of the investment projects of its current borrowers, and
is consistent with the experience of BRAC SME program in Bangladesh mentioned before
where most of the existing micro borrowers refused larger loan available under the SME
program. The intuition for the result that the maximum loan size is lower for the existing
members is that they protect the surplus they were getting from the membership. In con-
trast, the new members are willing to o¤er the total surplus generated by the microcredit
intervention when considering the participation in such a program.
(5) The Puzzle of Interest Rate Elasticity
When the labor market is characterized by transactions costs, the interest rate elasticity
of demand for microcredit becomes a non-linear function of a households non-labor asset
(land) with thresholds. This non-linearity is central to an understanding of the conicting
views about interest rate response of microcredit loans.
Proposition 6
(6.a) Consider a household with H 2
h
0; ~Hts
i
who is a member of the credit program
(K0; r^): Assume that the relative price of poultry Pc satises the following:
Pc > r^
 [(1  1) ~w]1  (24)
A marginal increase in the interest rate r^ does not reduce the demand for credit by household
H if the initial price-cost margin is higher than 
r^
:
(6.b) Consider a household H > ~Hts who is a member of the credit program (K0; r^):
The e¤ects of a higher interest rate on the credit demand of the household is (i) zero if
K0  Km(H; r^) + @Km(H;r^)@r^ ; (ii) negative if K0 = Km(H; r^) and  < :
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(6.c) Consider a Household with landholding H such that K0 = Km(H; r^); the interest
rate elasticity of demand for microcredit is higher for a relatively poor household (in terms
of land) if  > :
Proof
(6.a) Denote the unit cost function of poultry production by ~C(:): The proof follows
from the observation that when the initial price cost margin Pc 
~C((1 1) ~w;r^)
~C((1 1) ~w;r^)
> 
r^
, a marginal
increase in the interest rate does not violate inequality (24). This implies that a household
H 2
h
0; ~Hts
i
remains credit constrained at the higher interest rate. It is not surprising
that a credit constrained household does not respond to a higher interest rate by reducing
its demand for credit. In fact, if a higher interest rate is accompanied by a marginally
larger loan size o¤er by the NGO, the interest rate elasticity of such a households demand
for credit might appear to be positive. QED
(6.b) (i)The proof follows from the observation that when K0  Km(H; r^) + @Km(H;r^)@r^ ,
the household remains credit constrained at the new higher interest rate. (ii) For a house-
hold with K0 = Km(H; r^), the loan size o¤ered in the microcredit program is exactly equal
to the optimal demand and a higher interest rate has an unambiguously negative e¤ect on
the optimal credit demand for all households if  <  (see equation (23) above).
(6.c) When  > ; the result follows immediately from an inspection of equation (23)
above.
Discussion on Proposition 6
Proposition (6.a) and (6.b)-(i) are interesting in that they provide a basis for the view
common among practitioners that a higher interest rate may not adversely a¤ect the de-
mand for microcredit. The rest of the proposition (6) provides an explanation for two
interesting conclusions due to Dehejia et. al. (2007): (a) the interest rate elasticity of
microcredit demand is signicantly negative, and (b) the interest rate elasticity of poorer
borrowers is higher and as such a higher interest rate might have regressive e¤ects in term
of income distribution. Note that even though  <  is a su¢ cient condition for negative
interest rate elasticity 8H 2 [0; 1], other parameter restrictions can be imposed to ensure
that we have negative interest rate elasticity with  > :
The interest rate elasticity in our model is nonlinear with thresholds. With constant
returns technology, the response to a higher interest rate is zero for a household who is a
net supplier of labor from the market, as long as the unit cost is lower than the price of
output. This is consistent with the practitioners observation that there is excess demand
for membershipof micronance NGOs even with the high interest rates charged.28 The
households falling in the transactions cost band, on the other hand, may be sensitive to a
higher interest rate as they face diminishing returns to capital. They include the marginal
28The fact that interest rate elasticity is zero does not imply that there is no adverse e¤ects of high
interest rate on the welfare of the borrower (the net gain in income from participation decreases).
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participants in the program and the current interest rate is just enough to satisfy their
participation constraint. The households who are situated on their demand curve (marginal
value product of capital) and get rent from the membership are also likely to be responsive
to an interest rate increase as they try to protect the rent (prot). The econometric
evidence presented by Dehejia et. al. (2007) can be understood as the response of the two
latter groups of borrowers when interest rate is raised.
(6) Dynamic Incentives: Limits of Progressive Lending
The above results on the maximum loan size that the borrowers want to accept given an
interest rate have profound implications for appropriate design of the dynamic incentives
in microcredit programs. The recent literature such as Aghion and Morduch (2000, 2010)
has highlighted the importance of progressive lending as a mechanism to deter borrower
moral hazard. There has been a growing emphasis on the dynamic incentives recently, and
pioneering programs like Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has shifted from the so-called joint
liability schemes that harness peer monitoring and substitute social capital for physical
collateral. In the recent Grameen II program, the joint liability applies only at the margin.
Individual liability applies for the outstanding debt, but the members of a group gets a
certain percentage increase in the loan ceiling only if all members of the group (and of
the center) repay (Yunus, Grameen II). An implicit assumption underlying such dynamic
incentive scheme is that the borrowers are credit constrained at the going interest rate.
The above analysis shows that this might be a good description of households who are net
suppliers of labor in the market. However, the households which fall in the transaction cost
band may not demand larger loan size if it is bigger than a threshold. More importantly,
such demand constraint is likely to be more binding for the existing microcredit borrowers
as shown in proposition (5). Also, a larger loan size will push even the landless and labor
abundant households into the transaction cost band and thus a larger loan size may lose its
appeal. The e¢ cacy of dynamic incentives in microcredit programs that rely on the larger
loan size will, in general, depend on the structure of the labor market and the distribution
of non-labor assets, as the endowment of non-labor resources determine the location of a
household relative to the transaction cost band in the labor market.
Also, by assuming that the micronance products are tradable goods, our analysis
ignores the potential problem of lack of demand for these products. When the products
produced by microcredit borrowers are non-traded goods, the general equilibrium e¤ects
resulting from the consumer side may make a larger loan less attractive especially when
the preference is characterized by a non-homothetic utility function representing Engel
e¤ects. If there is a threshold of income below which the households demand for poultry is
insignicant, then a microcredit intervention might shift the supply curve but demand may
not increase signicantly. If the village is not integrated with large urban markets, then
this supply shift is likely to precipitate a collapse in the price of micronance products.
The price collapse (or a fear of price collapse) is likely to reduce the demand for larger
loans even more.
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(7) Conclusions
This paper, using a simple general equilibrium model where there are imperfections in
the labor market provides explanations for some of the most widely discussed issues and
puzzles in micronance today. The main results are as follows.
First, the high rates of return to microcredit nanced projects can be explained in terms
of low shadow wage rates faced by households (especially women) when the labor market
is missing or imperfect. The maximum interest rate a household is willing to pay for
membership in a microcredit program is higher when the labor market is missing compared
to the benchmark of a zero transactions costs labor market under two conditions: (i) if the
loan size is not larger than a threshold and (ii) the land endowment of the household is
smaller than a threshold. With a transactions cost band in the labor market, the maximum
interest rate is higher than the Neoclassical benchmark for a household that remains a net
supplier of labor to the market after the credit intervention. The maximum interest rate
a land-poor household is willing to pay for microcredit membership is a positive function
of the transactions costs in the labor market. Since the transactions cost is expected to
decline over time due to technological and social changes, the maximum interest rate a
micronance NGO can charge will also decline progressively.
Second, the microentrepreneurs might not be interested in scaling up their investment
projects as they face discontinuously higher wage rates for hiring labor from the market
(compared to the shadow price of in-house labor). The scaling up and consolidation of
microcredit projects into medium and large scale enterprises might also be constrained by
the very fact that microcredit reduces the need for women to look for work outside the
home, and thus might actually decelerate process of the development of a well-functioning
labor market in a village.
A transaction cost band that drives a wedge between the buying and selling price
of labor provides us with a plausible explanation for the divergent views regarding the
interest sensitivity of microcredit loans. With constant returns technology, the interest
rate elasticity is zero for a household who is a net supplier of labor from the market, as long
as the unit cost is lower than the price of output. This is consistent with the practitioners
observation that there is excess demand for membershipof micronance NGOs even with
the high interest rates charged. The households falling in the transactions cost band,
on the other hand, may be sensitive to a higher interest rate. They include the marginal
participants in the program such that the current interest rate is just enough to satisfy
their participation constraint. The inframarginal households who are already members of
microcredit program also respond negatively as they try to protect the rent they get from
the membership. The econometric evidence presented by Dehejia et. al. (2007) can be
understood as the response of these last two groups of borrowers when the interest rate is
raised.
Our analysis also have implications for the e¢ cacy of progressive lending as an instru-
ment of dynamic incentives for enforcement of the micronance contracts. Progressive
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lending can be very e¤ective for a household that remains a net seller of labor to the mar-
ket, as they prefer larger loans assuming that the unit cost of production is lower than
the output price. However, some households (relatively better endowed with non-labor
resources) are likely to nd themselves situated in the transaction cost band in the labor
market, and the lure of a larger loan size has little disciplining role for such a household if
the diminishing returns to capital is strong enough. This sounds a cautionary note about
the e¢ cacy of the programs that rely heavily on the loan sizeas an incentive mechanism.
Perhaps the most important implication of the analysis developed in this paper is that
microcredit may play a vital role in creating economic opportunities when the labor market
is underdeveloped, but in the long run when labor market develops, and technological and
social changes reduce the cost of womens participation in the labor market, the demand
for such high interest rate micro loans will go down progressively.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
The equilibrium gross wage rate ~w is determined from the following market clearing
condition:
1  
(1 + 2) ~w
 1
 1  (Htp)2
2
+

1  
(1  1) ~w
 1
 H2ts
2
= Lf (1 Htp +Hts) (25)
where
Htp =
Lf
(1 )
(1+2) ~w
 1

; Hts =
Lf
(1 )
(1 1) ~w
 1

(26)
So all households with land sizeH < Hts are the net suppliers of labor and all households
with land size H > Htp are the net buyers, while for a household with H 2 [Hts; Htp]
the market is missing and the household is self-su¢ cient in terms of labor. Denote the
household that is self-su¢ cient in the Neoclassical case by H. It follows from the market
clearing condition that
H =
Lf
(1 )
w
 1

We show that the following holds: ~w > w and (1   1) ~w < w: First, note that
evaluated at ~w = w, equation (25) implies excess demand for labor. With 2 = 0 , the
mass of households that demand labor from the market is una¤ected (compared to the
Neoclassical case) as can be seen from the fact that H

Htp
= 1 and the demand of each
household remains same as before. The supply of labor to the market is, however, lower
for two reasons: (i) Hts decreases, i.e., some households that were net supplier of labor
now fall within the transaction cost band (household specic missing market) and (ii) the
households who remain net supplier after the intervention, they also supply less facing a
lower net wage rate (i.e., it is more protable to use labor within the household). So to
restore market clearing it must be true that ~w > w: The statement that Hts decreases
relative to H follows from:
H
Hts
=

(1 )
(1 1)w
 1


(1 )
w
 1

> 1
Now consider the case when ~w = w

(1 1) . In this case, the supply of labor to the market
remains una¤ected. But with a higher wage rate ~w > w , the demand contracts, i.e.,
(1 Htp) is smaller and the households who stay net demander of labor from the market
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demand less as the wage rate is higher. The statement that (1 Htp) is smaller follows
from:
H
Htp
=

(1 1)(1 )
(1+2)w

 1


(1 )
w
 1

< 1
So it must be true that ~w < w

(1 1) which implies (1  1) ~w < w
: QED
Proof of Proposition 3
(3.a) Under the assumption of marginal intervention, the credit does not a¤ect the
equilibrium wage rate, however it changes the shadow price of labor faced by the household.
For a household H to remain a net seller of labor after the credit intervention, the following
needs to be satised: 2 (H;K) < (1  1) ~w: This implies the following inequality:
H < ~Hts =
Lf  K	c
	a
where (27)
	a =

1  
(1  1) ~w
 1

and 	c =

1  
(1  1) ~w
 1

(28)
Now the result follows from the observation that for any household that remains a net
seller of labor after the credit intervention, the shadow price of labor in an imperfect market
is (1 1) ~w which is smaller than the neoclassical wage and thus return to poultry farming
is higher in an imperfect labor market (from equation (6) above). QED.
(3.b) The proof follows from the claims that @ ~w
@1
> 0 and ~w > (1 1) @ ~w@1 : It is easy to
check from the market clearing condition (25) above that @ ~w
@1
> 0. The second inequality
implies that the endogeneous wage response @ ~w
@1
is not too strong and thus @((1 1) ~w)
@1
< 0:
Assume that, to the contrary, the endogeneous wage response is strong enough to o¤set the
direct negative e¤ect of a higher transaction costs, i.e. @((1 1) ~w)
@1
= 0, thus implying that
(1  1) @ ~w@1 = ~w: In this case the labor demand and supply behavior of all the households
with H < Hts (i.e., the households that are net seller of labor) remains unchanged following
an increase in 1 but the households H > Htp (i.e., the households who are net buyers of
labor) adjust to a higher wage rate given that @ ~w
@1
> 0. This however creates excess supply
of labor in the market. This can be seen from the following:
@

	a(1 (Htp)2)
2
  Lf (1 Htp)

@ ~w
=
1
2
@	a
@ ~w

1  L
2
f
	2a

< 0
The above result follows from @	a
@ ~w
< 0 and 	a > Lf . The last inequality holds as
long as the total demand for labor by the households H > Htp is positive. The term
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
	a(1 (Htp)2)
2
  Lf (1 Htp)

shows the excess demand for labor by the householdsH > Htp:
QED
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